By Christoph Reuter
Source: Der Spiegel
In the fight against Islamic State, the West is considering
cooperating with the Syrian army. There's a hitch though: Assad's troops
aren't just too weak to defeat IS -- they also have no interest in
doing so.
Sunday, Nov. 29, was market day in Ariha, a small city located in the
northwestern Syrian province of Idlib. In May, various rebel groups had
taken control of the town, which is legendary for its deep-red
cherries. Ariha is located far from the front, and even further away
from areas under the control of Islamic State (IS). But the Russian air
force bombed it anyway.
The people shopping at the market didn't stand a chance. Just seconds
after the roar of the approaching Russian Sukhoi fighter jet first
became audible, the first bombs struck. They killed passersby, vegetable
sellers and entire families. "I saw torn up bodies flying around and
children calling for their parents," said a civil defense rescuer hours
after the attack.
One day prior, just before 10 a.m., it was the turn of Safarana, a
small city northeast of Homs. A first barrel bomb, dropped out of a
Syrian regime helicopter, killed a man and a young girl and injured more
than a dozen others. The victims had hardly been delivered to the
clinic when two more barrel bombs exploded in front of the hospital,
operated by Doctors without Borders, killing patients and paramedics who
were caring for those who had just arrived.
Such attacks are nothing new in Syria. Jets from both Syria and
Russia continue unhindered to bomb markets, hospitals, bakeries and
pretty much any other place where people gather in the provinces that
are under rebel control. Two years ago, Russia voted in favor of United
Nations Resolution 2139, which was supposed to bring an end to attacks
on Syrian civilians. But that hasn't prevented Russia from flying
hundreds of exactly those kinds of bombing raids itself since the end of
September. And that, in turn, hasn't prevented France from talking to
Russia about the possibility of conducting coordinated air strikes and
joining together in the fight against Islamic State.
Just three weeks after the terror attacks in Paris, Europe has
prepared itself for entry into this war against Islamic State. But it is
a war that unites many radically divergent elements -- and one for
which there is no strategy. French jets, joined recently by British
warplanes, are now flying sorties against IS in Syria. And Germany will
soon join them. German
Tornado jets,
equipped with high-resolution imaging technology, are to help identify
targets while A-310 aircraft will refuel warplanes in the air. In
addition, a German frigate is to provide protection to a French aircraft
carrier in the Mediterranean.
Partnership with the Dictator
But beyond Germany's limited contribution to the air war, Berlin and
Paris are discussing a vastly more sensitive and extremely uncertain
engagement on the ground. Meanwhile, the French government -- which had
long been a vocal opponent of Syrian President Bashar Assad -- recently
introduced the idea of a possible partnership with the dictator and his
troops in a joint alliance to fight IS.
German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen recently said somewhat
awkwardly of Syria: "There are parts of the troops, that one could very
well -- like in the Iraq example, where the training of local troops was
very successful -- emulate here too." Her spokesperson quickly made it
clear that such a concept doesn't apply to troops under Assad's command.
But the idea of cooperating with Assad is one under discussion: Islamic
State terror in Europe would seem to have partially rehabilitated the
dictator.
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier even proposed that fighting
between the Syrian opposition and regime troops could be "discontinued,
for a start." Steinmeier's words reveal his frustration at the fact that
the two sides are engaging each other in a war of attrition instead of
joining forces against IS. But the reality on the ground refuses to
conform to his aspirations.
Indeed, it is increasingly difficult to identify such a potential
partner for Europe on the Syrian battlegrounds. Assad's official army is
now just one of many fighting forces on the side of the regime -- and
is also suffering from poor morale and a lack of soldiers. For many
young Syrians from areas under government control, forced conscription
has become the most significant motivator for embarking on the refugee
trail to Europe.
This is also one reason why Russia's initial strategy for Syria is
not finding success. Moscow had been hoping that massive air strikes
would force rebel fighters in opposition-held areas to abandon the
fight. That would then pave the way for Assad's ground forces to advance
and take back those regions. But in October, when Assad's tank units
rolled into those areas that Russian jets had previously bombed, they
didn't get very far. Instead of fleeing, rebels there had dug in
instead.
Syrian Fighting Force?
Using TOW anti-tank missiles supplied by the US, in addition to
Russian anti-tank weapons that had been captured or acquired from
corrupt officers, the rebels struck some 20 tanks before the others
turned back. The army's ground offensive south of Aleppo likewise
quickly ground to a halt. Meanwhile, rebels near Hama were able to
finally take control of a long-contested city.
Assad's army isn't just vulnerable, it also isn't strictly a Syrian
force anymore. For the last two years, the forces on his side have
increasingly been made up of foreigners, including Revolutionary Guards
from Iran, members of Iraqi militias and Hezbollah units from Lebanon.
They are joined at the front by Shiite Afghans from the Hazara people,
up to 2 million of whom live in Iran, mostly as illegal immigrants. They
are forcibly conscripted in Iranian prisons and sent to Syria --
according to internal Iranian estimates, there are between 10,000 and
20,000 of them fighting in the country. The situation leads to absurd
scenes: In the southern Syrian town of Daraa, rebels began desperately
searching for Persian interpreters after an offensive of 2,500 Afghans
suddenly began approaching.
It is the first international Shiite jihad in history, one which has
been compensating for the demographic inferiority of Assad's troops
since 2012. The alliance has prevented Assad's defeat, but it hasn't
been enough for victory either. Furthermore, the orders are no longer
coming exclusively from the Syrian officer corps. Iranian officers
control their own troops in addition to the Afghan units, and they plan
offensives that also involve Syrian soldiers. Hezbollah commanders
coordinate small elite units under their control. Iraqis give orders to
Iraqi and Pakistani militia groups. And the Russians don't let anyone
tell them what to do.
The odd alliances aren't just limited to the Shiite fighters.
Anti-Assad rebels were recently surprised to see American Humvees -- a
vehicle that quickly became a symbol of IS attacks after the Islamists
captured hundreds of them in Iraq in summer 2014 -- rolling towards them
from government-controlled territory. "We thought only IS had captured
Humvees, but the Shiite militias fighting alongside Assad use them too,"
said Osama Abu Zaid, a local legal advisor to various groups belonging
to the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
Elsewhere, attacks by Assad supporters and by Islamic State have
likewise taken place with astonishing temporal and geographic proximity
to each other. Near the northern Syrian city of Tal Rifaat in early
November, for example, an IS suicide attacker detonated his car bomb at
an FSA base, though without causing much damage. Just half an hour
later, two witnesses say, Russian jets attacked the same base for the
first time.
Unsurprising Cooperation
Was it a coincidence? Likely not. There have been dozens of cases
since 2014 in which Assad's troops and IS have apparently been
coordinating attacks on rebel groups, with the air force bombing them
from above and IS firing at them from the ground. In early June, the US
State Department announced that the regime wasn't just avoiding IS
positions, but was actively reinforcing them.
Such cooperation isn't surprising. The rebels -- in all their
variety, from nationalists to radical Islamists -- represent the
greatest danger to both Assad and IS. And if the two sides want to
survive in the long term, the Syrian dictator and the jihadists are
useful to each other. From Assad's perspective, if the rebels were to be
vanquished, the world would no longer see an alternative to the Syrian
dictator. But the rebels are also primarily Sunni, as are two-thirds of
the Syrian populace -- meaning that, from the IS perspective, once the
rebels were defeated, the populace would be faced either with submission
and exile, or they would join IS.
In short, a Syria free of rebels would put both Assad and Islamic
State in powerful positions, though not powerful enough to defeat the
other. Still, such a situation would be vastly preferable to the
alternatives: Being toppled from power (Assad), or being destroyed (IS).
Relative to those two camps, the Syrian opposition in the West is
hardly being paid attention to anymore. That is in part a function of
their confusing structure: There are dozens of larger rebel groups and
hundreds of smaller units, mostly at a local level. They cooperate, but
alliances often crumble due to the ideological differences of their
foreign supporters.
British Prime Minister David Cameron presented numbers last week
indicating the existence of some 70,000 moderate rebels. In addition, he
said, there were two large Islamist groups: Ahrar al-Sham in the north,
with 15,000 fighters; and Jaish al-Islam north of Damascus, with 12,500
militiamen -- and the al-Qaida-allied group Nusra Front, with its 6,000
to 10,000 men. Cameron had hardly finished reciting the numbers before
questions were raised as to whether the 70,000 he cited were prepared to
partner with the West in the battle against Islamic State. They have,
though, been fighting against Islamic State since January 2014 -- but
have primarily focused their fight on Assad.
Significant Moral Question
Sending ground troops into such a situation, or even lending
legitimacy to the Russian-Syrian offensive, would unwittingly transform
Europe into Assad's vassals. Beyond that, the dictator would have to be
given troop reinforcements so that he could halfway successfully advance
against the enemy.
Even if one were to ignore all of the military problems, there is
also a significant moral question: Would the West really want to go into
battle with a regime that has used, aside from nuclear weapons, pretty
much every weapon imaginable against its own populace in an effort to
cling to power? And once Islamic State is defeated and driven away, what
should happen with the cities -- such as Raqqa, Deir el-Zour, al-Bab,
Manbij and Abu Kamal -- that they now hold? All those cities had been
take over by local rebels long before Islamic State moved in. Who should
such areas be given to?
Certainly not to Assad. That would merely turn the clock back on this
war by three years. Rebel groups would once again try to throw out
Assad's troops -- and ultimately Islamic State would strike again.
Making matters even more complicated is the fact that IS, the declared
enemy-number-one of international efforts, is receding from the focus of
two major foreign actors in Syria. Ever since Turkey shot down the
Russian jet, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin
have been engaged in a proxy war in the Aleppo province, a conflict
which has seen Kurdish IS-opponents exchanging fire with Sunni
IS-opponents in recent days. Furthermore, Russian jets have stepped up
their bombing campaign against Syrian settlements along the border with
Turkey while the Turkish secret service is sending weapons and
ammunition into the fight against the Kurds. Both presidents have
fragile egos, and Syria has emerged as the perfect playing field for
them to get Kurdish YPG units and rebel groups -- both of which had thus
far focused their efforts on Islamic State -- to fight against each
other.
And Islamic State? The jihadists had been facing significant pressure
in recent months from ongoing air strikes launched by the US-led
coalition. Not because it had lost ground, but because it had been
unable to continue its advance. The group's exploitative economy and its
propaganda image both make a steady stream of victories necessary. The
"caliphate" is facing financial difficulties and is also having trouble
recruiting more foreign fighters. An expansion of allied air strikes
could likely increase the pressure, while cooperation with Assad would
put Islamic State in a perfect strategic position.
But for as long as Islamic State's enemies are busy fighting each
other, the Islamists can carry on as before. Like last Wednesday, when
the jihadists took over the small city of Kafra north of Aleppo -- not
long after it had been bombed by Russian jets.